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Abstract
Hungary implemented a number of new policies from the late 1980s to the early 1990s,
shifting from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Despite the top-down
market reforms, Hungary lacked the knowledge to build a fully functional financial system.
Eventually, an economic turmoil caused by the collapse of eastern markets and fragility in
the financial system led to the banking crisis of 1992–1993, revealing the
undercapitalization of the financial system. The government implemented the
recapitalization, or “bank consolidation,” as part of a stabilization program. It injected
capital into banks in three stages—in December 1993, May 1994, and December 1994—so
that their capital ratios would be raised to the 8% Basel accord minimum. The government
expected recapitalization to address imprudent lending behaviors (the flow problem) by
tying receipt of the funds with banks’ commitment to improve their risk management and
controls. The asset purchase could only improve the quality of banks’ existing portfolios
(the stock problem). Banks were required to submit restructuring plans (“consolidation
plans”) upon participating in the capital injection, although some banks received the capital
even if they did not provide adequate plans. Along with the recapitalization program,
prudential regulation and accounting standards were amended. The recapitalization was
successful overall, although larger banks benefited more than smaller banks.
Keywords: broad-based, broad-based, capital injection, capital injection, centrally planned
economy, Hungary, transition economy
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The Hungarian Bank Recapitalization Program
(1993–1994)

At a Glance
Prior to the transition to a market
economy, the banking system in Hungary
was based on a “monobank” system,
under which the majority of the financial
services were provided by the National
Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
or MNB) (Neale and Bozski 2001, 148).
As in other centrally planned economies,
lending and credit creation in Hungary
were often politically determined. To
transition toward an open-marketoriented
economy,
Hungary
implemented a number of new policies
from the late 1980s to the early 1990s.
For instance, in 1986, Hungary
introduced a two-tier banking system,
separating the central bank from newly
chartered,
state-owned
commercial
banks, thereby separating monetary
policy from commercial financial
intermediation (Neale and Bozski 2001,
149, 150–51). In and after 1991, Hungary
introduced the Accounting Act (which set
new
accounting
standards),
the
Bankruptcy Act, and the Banking Act
(which addressed loan qualification,
regulations on provisions, and other
microprudential policies) (Tang, Zoli, and
Klytchnikova 2000, 13).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To assist firms and to inject capital into banks
to raise their capital ratios to the 8% Basel accord
minimum (Neale and Bozski 2001, 153).
Launch Dates

December 1993, May 1994,
December 1994 (IMF 1995,
155)

Usage

Total: HUF 169.1 billion
($1.3 billion) (IMF 1995)

Eligibility

Banks whose capital ratios
did not meet the regulatory
standards in each phase. The
rule was flexible, and larger
banks tended to receive more
capital (Balassa 1996, 15)

Administrator

Government, mostly led by the
Ministry of Finance

Legal Authority

The recapitalization process
was authorized by the Bank
Consolidation Act of 1994.
Parliament passed each
process, taking a step-by-step
approach (Balassa 1996, 32)

The recapitalization was
Despite the top-down market reforms, Notable Features
implemented in three stages
Hungary lacked the knowledge to build a
(December 1993, May 1994,
fully
functional
financial
system.
and December 1994) (IMF
Commercial banks struggled with
1995, 155); the
nonperforming loans that were inherited
recapitalization prepared
from the MNB during the socialist system
banks for privatization and
(Balassa 1996, 23). Commercial bank
purchase by foreign investors
managers and supervisors lacked
(Bonin and Schaffer 1995, 73)
knowledge and management skills, which
further deteriorated banks’ balance
sheets. As many other transitioning
countries, Hungary hired International Monetary Fund (IMF) experts, advisors, and
economists but with moderate achievements. Eventually, the economic turmoil caused by
the collapse of eastern markets revealed the undercapitalization and fragility in the
financial system and led to the banking crisis of 1992–1993 (Balassa 1996, 23). Between
1990 and 1993, real GDP in Hungary fell by approximately 20% (Nováková 2003, 24).
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According to the then newly introduced accounting and regulatory standards, as of
December 31, 1993, nonperforming loans amounted to HUF 418 billion, approximately
more than 70% of the loans in the financial system (Balassa 1996, 13). (See Figure1; IMF
1995, 154.)
Figure 1: Hungary Banks’ Loan Portfolios, 1991–1994

Source: IMF 1995.

Consequently, the government implemented a number of stabilization measures, including
nonperforming loan purchases in 1992–1993 (Dreyer 2021), privatization, and foreign
ownership takeover in 1995–1997. One of these stabilization measures was the
recapitalization program in December 1993, and May and December 1994, in which the
government provided new capital by acquiring common stock or subordinated loans issued
by the commercial banks.3
The previous governmental intervention, an asset purchase program from 1992 to 1993,
turned out to be insufficient to remedy banks’ impaired balance sheets; thus, alternative
approaches to address the nonperforming loans were considered (Balassa 1996, 13;
Dreyer 2021; IMF 1995, 147). Consequently, the government planned the recapitalization
package based on advice from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(Balassa 1996, 13). The recapitalization was expected to stop existing imprudent lending
behaviors and improve bank governance by requiring banks to sign agreements with the
government, while the asset purchase program could only improve the quality of banks’
existing portfolios (IMF 1995, 147).
The government recapitalized banks over three stages (Neale and Bozski 2001, 153). (See
Figure 2.) First, in December 1993, capital was injected into eight participating banks

3

Note that the recapitalization program is sometimes referred as “bank consolidation.”
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(Magyar Hitel Bank [MHB], Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank [K&H], Budapest Bank [BB],
Mezobank, Takarekbank, Agrobank, Dunabank, and Iparbankhaz) to raise their capital
adequacy ratios to 0%, from an estimated negative 15%. Second, in May 1994, capital was
injected to the three largest banks (MHB, K&H, and BB) and four other smaller banks so
that their capital ratios would reach 4% (IMF 1995, 155; Neale and Bozski 2001, 153).
Lastly, in December 1994, four large state-owned banks received a capital injection to
boost their capital ratio to 8%. While the first two capital injections took the form of equity
purchase by the government, the last capital injections of December 1994 took the form of
30-year subordinated loans from the government (IMF 1995, 149). In exchange for the
recapitalization, banks committed to reforms, which ultimately prepared them for
privatization (Neale and Bozski 2001, 153). As shown in Figure 2, while the estimation
varies amongst literature, approximately HUF 165 billion to HUF 180 billion was injected
throughout the recapitalization process. It cost approximately 5% of Hungarian GDP (IMF
1995, 155; Nováková 2003, 27).
Figure 2: Hungary Consolidation Usage Amount

Note: CCBs are “credit-consolidation bonds.”
Source: IMF 1995.

Summary Evaluation
While the asset purchase scheme prior to the recapitalization program was considered
ineffective (Dreyer 2021), the capital injection program has received positive evaluations
from a number of studies (IMF 1995; Neale and Bozski 2001). The confidence of domestic
depositors as well as foreign investors recovered, and Hungary benefited from the
subsequent high capital inflow per capita (Neale and Bozski 2001).
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Balassa (1996) finds that the recapitalization was successful overall, though the successes
seemed to be unevenly spread. Large banks that were recapitalized avoided bankruptcy,
saw positive cash flow, and had their capital adequacy ratios improved. However, smaller
banks that received limited capital did not necessarily see much recovery on their balance
sheets and suffered from persistent losses (Balassa 1996).
On the other hand, Bonin and Schaffer (1995) criticize the design of the recapitalization
scheme. First, they argue that, though the first capital injection, in December 1993, was
meant to boost the capital adequacy ratios of participating banks to at least 0%, five of the
eight banks still had negative capital adequacy ratios at the end of 1993 after taking
account of this first tranche recapitalization (Bonin and Schaffer 1995). Furthermore,
Bonin and Schaffer (1995) note that the design of the recapitalization was flawed, given
that banks with low capital received more capital support, regardless of their bad capital
management in the past, and argue that the plan could have been designed better if the
government had considered future foreign investors and the privatization process.
The restructuring measures, including the recapitalization, were inevitably costly. Until the
end of 1994, approximately HUF 330 billion worth of “consolidation government bonds”
were issued. By mid-1996, the value of the consolidation government bonds issued reached
HUF 360 billion, increasing the gross debt of the country. The debt service further
burdened the government’s budget. The net interest payments on government bonds
reached approximately 1.2% of GDP in 1994 and further rose to 1.6% of GDP in 1995
(Balassa 1996).
As a result of the recapitalization, the government’s direct ownership of banks increased
significantly. According to the IMF (1995), as a result of the two capital injections in
December 1993 and May 1994, the state ownership share in seven of the eight
participating banks rose sharply, to more than 75%. The state ownership share of large
participating banks was well above the legal maximum (25%) mandated by the Act on
Financial Institutions, and therefore, the target date to reduce state ownership below the
legal maximum was extended to 1997. For the banking sector as a whole, the share owned
directly by the state increased from 38% at end-1991 to more than 67% at end-1994 (IMF
1995).
Lastly, the recapitalization and consecutive reforms, particularly the regulatory reforms,
changed the market shares of banks; for instance, according to Neale and Bozski (2001),
the share of corporate lending of Magyar Hitel Bank dropped from 50% to 7% as a result of
multiple reforms and increasing competition in the sector.
The multiple reforms were authorized by a combination of banking, accounting, and
bankruptcy laws, an overhaul that shifted the entire Hungarian financial system. As Dreyer
(2021) explains, in December 1991, the Hungarian government introduced the Banking
Act, which required banks to reach a capital adequacy ratio of 8% by 1994 and accumulate
loan-loss reserves. This act also introduced three categories for rating loan portfolios (Ábel
and Bonin 1993) and established the State Banking Supervisory Agency (SBS) (Borish et al.
1996). The establishment of the Banking Act was followed by the enactment of a new
bankruptcy law, which became effective on January 1, 1992, requiring any company with
any outstanding debt that was more than 90 days in arrears to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings (Ábel and Bonin 1993).
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Hungary Context 1991–1994
$33.4 billion in 1991 (HUF
2,498.3 bn)
$37.3 billion in 1992 (HUF
GDP
2942.6 bn)
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$38.6 billion in 1993 (HUF
USD)
3548.3 bn)
$41.5 billion in 1994 (HUF
4364.8 bn)
$3,219.77 in 1991
GDP per capita
$3,597.11 in 1992
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$3,726.83 in 1993
USD)
$4013.94 in 1994
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
Data not available in 1991–1994
debt)
$28.2 billion in banking system
assets in 1991
$28.9 billion in banking system
Size of banking system
assets in 1992
$28.6 billion in banking system
assets in 1993
$29.2 billion in banking system
assets in 1994
Banking system assets equal to
84.4% of 1991 GDP
Banking system assets equal to
Size of banking system as a percentage of
77.3% of 1992 GDP
GDP
Banking system assets equal to
74.1% of 1993 GDP
Banking system assets equal to
70.4% of 1994 GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
Data not available in 1991–1994
financial system
41.5% of total assets in 1991
43.7% of total assets in 1992
Five-bank concentration of banking system
42.7% of total assets in 1993
38.6% of total assets in 1993
14.7% foreign or jointly owned
in 1991
15.3% foreign or jointly owned
in 1992
Foreign involvement in banking system
28% foreign or jointly owned in
1993
31.1% foreign or jointly owned
in 1994
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90% majority ownership
(assets) in 1990
Government ownership of banking system
27% majority ownership
(assets) in 1995
“Until 1993 deposits were
Existence of deposit insurance
unlimitedly guaranteed by the
state”
Source: Ábel and Szakadát 1997, 161; Borish et al. 1996, 11, Hungarian National
Deposit Insurance Fund (OBA/NDIF) website; IMF 1995, tab. 69, 156; World Bank
Population Data.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: The recapitalization of Hungarian banks was part of
“consolidation” initiatives by the government in early 1990s that also included
purchasing nonperforming assets and restructuring state-owned debtors.
The recapitalization of Hungarian banks in early 1990s was part of “consolidation” that
began in mid-1992. The consolidation took three forms (Neale and Bozski 2001):
Asset purchases—Asset purchases through the Loan Consolidation Program involved
substituting bad debt for long-dated (20-year) Treasury bonds with a variable interest rate,
linked to the Treasury bill yield of the previous quarter (see Dreyer 2021).
Recapitalization—The government recapitalized banks by purchasing common stock or
subordinated loans.
Debtor restructuring—This process endowed capital directly to banks’ debtors to improve
their financial conditions preparatory to their own privatizations.
Each process took several stages. The recapitalization was implemented over three stages:
in December 1993, May 1994, and December 1994 (IMF 1995). Balassa (1996) argues that
the step-by-step approach taken by the government had negative consequences. The
author argues that uncertainty, combined with the slowness of the legislation process, may
have led to technical complications and a decline in efficiency. Balassa further argues that
the slow and politically turbulent legislative process hindered public understanding of the
details of the program and the importance of the consolidation processes. The author
laments that “it might have been more expedient to implement the consolidation of the
banking sector on the basis of one or more laws . . . Perhaps, had that been the case, less
mistakes would have been made during its implementation” (Balassa, 1996).
2.

Legal Authority and Communications: The recapitalization process was
authorized by the Bank Consolidation Act of 1994.

The recapitalization process was authorized by the Bank Consolidation Act (Neale and
Bozski 2001). Yet, Neale and Bozski (2001) argue that the legality of early consolidation
processes was “flimsy.” The budget law of 1993 authorized the government to issue credit
consolidation bonds (CCBs) to fund its interventions. The law did not specify the limits of
issuance and other details; the government took care of such details through executive
orders.
3. Administration/Governance: The Ministry of Finance (MOF) took the initiative in
the consolidation process, as well as in the development of the supervisory and
regulatory system.
The Ministry of Finance took the initiative in the consolidation process, as well as in the
development of the supervisory and regulatory system (Neale and Bozski 2001).
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4. Eligible Institutions: Capital was injected in financial institutions that did not
meet capital ratio regulatory requirements.
Capital was injected in financial institutions that did not meet capital ratio regulatory
requirements (Balassa 1996). The threshold of the targeted capital adequacy ratio and the
targeted banks evolved over time. Larger banks and state banks were more likely to receive
capital. Furthermore, after the second capital injection, in May 1994, participating financial
institutions were required to submit “consolidation plans,” detailing the modernization of
business policies, management, and risk management (see the Restructuring Plan section
for further details) (IMF 1995).
Prior to the first capital injection, in December 1993, the Ministry of Finance identified 10
significant financial institutions (Magyar Hitel Bank [MHB], Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank
[K&H], Budapest Bank [BB], Mezobank, Takarekbank, Agrobank, Dunabank, Iparbankhaz,
Konzumbank, and Realbank) and further determined whether to inject capital to those
banks whose capital adequacy ratios were negative (Bonin and Schaffer 1995).4 Realbank
underwent a management buyout and was privatized, and it became apparent that the
capital adequacy ratio of Konzumbank was above 8%. Ultimately, the other eight banks
(MHB, K&H, BB, Mezobank, Takarekbank, Agrobank, Dunabank, and Iparbankhaz) received
the first round of capital injections, in December 1993 (Bonin and Schaffer 1995) (See
Figure 3).

Furthermore, some savings cooperatives and other smaller-scale banks from the consolidation program and
the “sour sixteen,” selected large state-owned institutions employing in excess of 7% of the industrial labor
force, were also included (Bonin and Schaffer 1995).
4
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Figure 3: Banks’ Capital Adequacy Ratios (CARs) below Zero after the Capital Injection in
December 1993

Note: A=Agrobank, BB=Budapest Bank, D=Dunabank, I=Iparbankhaz, K&H=Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank,
M=Mezobank, MHB=Magyar Hitel Bank, and T=Takarekbank.
Source: Bonin and Schaffer 1995, 69.

In the second injection, in May 1994, banks with capital adequacy ratios below 4% were
eligible. The Ministry of Finance injected capital so that banks’ capital adequacy ratios
would reach 4%. Finally, in the third injection, in December 1994, four large state-owned
banks received capital so that their capital adequacy ratios would reach 8%, the ratio
required by Bank for International Settlements rules (Balassa 1996). The Basel accord
called for a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% to be implemented by
the end of 1992. This framework was introduced not only in Group of Ten countries but
also in virtually all countries. Hungarian banks were required to reach a capital adequacy
ratio of 8% by 1994.
There were a few exceptions to the eligibility rule. For instance, in May 1994, the National
Savings and Commercial Bank (Országos Takarék Pénztár, or OTP), one of the largest
commercial banks, received a HUF 5 billion capital injection twice in 1993 and 1994, even
though its capital adequacy ratio had already exceeded 4% and even though it was not
designated as one of 10 banks nominated by the government in December 1993 (IMF
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1995). Furthermore, smaller banks did not participate in the last round of capital
injections, in December 1994, as it was assumed the smaller banks would be able to raise
their capital ratios through privatization and partnerships with larger banks (Ábel and
Szakadát 1997). The deviation in implementation varied with discretionary governmental
judgments.
5. Size: There was no preannounced size of the injection, but the government
injected approximately HUF 165 billion to HUF 180 billion (equivalent to 5% of
then GDP) of capital over the three stages. The recapitalization process cost
approximately 5% of Hungarian GDP in 1993.
While estimations vary, approximately HUF 165 billion to HUF 180 billion was injected
throughout the recapitalization process. It was approximately 5% of Hungarian GDP in
1993 (IMF 1995; Nováková 2003). The first capital injection, in December 1993, was the
largest in terms of size, totaling more than HUF 100 billion (see Figure 2 in the “At a
Glance” section above).
6. Source of Injections: The government issued more than HUF 350 billion in credit
consolidation bonds to inject capital.
The budget law of 1993 authorized the government to issue credit consolidation bonds.
The CCBs issued under the budget law of 1993 had a maturity of 20 years, and interest was
to be paid twice yearly, compared to the formerly issued CCBs, which paid interest once a
year (Ábel and Bonin 1992; IMF 1995). CCBs were deployed both in the loan consolidation
program (see Dreyer 2021) and the recapitalization program (IMF 1995). In the
recapitalization, the government acquired the equity in the banks by purchasing newly
issued shares with CCBs (IMF 1995).
Until the end of 1994, approximately HUF 330 billion worth of CCBs were issued by the
government, and by mid-1996, the number reached HUF 360 billion (Balassa 1996). The
CCBs were also used (1) to purchase HUF 1.9 billion in equity from existing commercial
bank shareholders; (2) to grant the savings cooperatives HUF 5.9 billion in subordinated
loans and to increase their capital by HUF 2.7 billion; and (3) to grant the OTP a HUF 5
billion subordinated loan (IMF 1995.
While the state later sold some of the banks above their book values after the recovery, the
cost of the consolidation (including other nonrecapitalization measures) was expensive,
burdening the state budget. As Figure 4 shows, despite the successful privatizations, the
total proceeds (HUF 98.9 billion) from selling the privatized banks covered only 35% of the
consolidation costs (Neale and Bozski 2001).
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Figure 4: Privatization Revenue Relative to Consolidation Cost

Note: Postabank was privatized in 2003.
Source: Neale and Bozski 2001, 166.

7. Individual Participation Limits: There seem to have been no fixed participation
limits.
There seem to have been no fixed participation limits.
8. Capital Characteristics: The Ministry of Finance recapitalized the banks using
two methods: equity acquisition and the extension of 30-year subordinated loans
from the government.
The first capital injection, in December 1993, took the form of voting shares. The
government recapitalized eight banks by purchasing newly issued banks’ common stocks
with CCBs (IMF 1995). The second capital injection, in May 1994, took a mixed form. For
the three large banks, capital was injected by acquiring additional common stocks with
voting shares so that their capital ratios would reach 4%. For the four smaller banks, the
Ministry of Finance acquired voting shares to increase capital to a 2% capital ratio level;
the remaining 2% was filled with subordinated loans (Balassa 1996).
The third capital injection, in December 1994, took the form of a 30-year subordinated
loan. In order to offset the budgetary impact of the lending, interest payments on CCBs and
on the subordinated loans were adjusted (IMF 1995).
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Figure 5: Expenditure on Consolidation 1992–1994 (HUF millions)

Source: Neale and Bozski 2001, 155.

9.

Restructuring Plan (1): As a precondition of the May 1994 recapitalization,
banks were required to submit medium-term restructuring programs, or
“consolidation plans.”

As a precondition of the May 1994 recapitalization, banks were required to submit
“consolidation plans.” The consolidation plans prescribed management strategies for bank
reorganization and required the banks to participate actively in enterprise debt resolution
programs (Balassa, 1996; IMF 1995). The enterprise debt resolution program involved
determining the circle of clients to be dealt with in the course of debtor conciliation,
another program run by the government (Balassa 1996). The agreements based on the
consolidation plans also detailed certain bank restructuring procedures on an individual
(bank-by-bank) basis (Bonin and Schaffer 1995).
Amongst three banks that received capital in December 1994, only BB had submitted a
consolidation program acceptable to the government by the end of 1994. The government
rejected the plans submitted by MHB and K&H. These two banks submitted revised
consolidation plans and eventually replaced top management in late 1994 and early 1995,
in order to obtain the government’s approval. With some delay, all banks, including MHB
and K&H, received the capital (IMF 1995; Neale and Bozski 2001).
10. Restructuring Plan (2): The majority of banks established separate units or
departments to deal with capital injections and nonperforming loans.
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Establishing separate units effectively prepared banks to separate their “good
banks” from “bad banks” for privatization.
The majority of banks created a separate internal or external workout unit to deal with the
nonperforming loans. Separating the liquidation process from normal bank business not
only avoided unintended disruptions in the financial system but also prepared banks for
privatization by separating “good banks” from “bad banks.” Some banks sold their
nonperforming loans to private liquidation organizations (Nováková 2003). For instance, in
order to deal with their nonperforming loans, Budapest Bank formed 2B Ltd., K&H and
Mezobank jointly set up Kvantumbank, and MHB established Risk Ltd. (Neale and Bozski
2001).
11. Exit Strategy: An exit strategy was not announced, but the goal was to privatize
the commercial banks.
No further detail was found for this Key Design Decision.
12. Other Regulatory Changes: As a part of banking sector reform, prudential
regulation as well as accounting standards were amended.
In the 1990s, Hungary adopted new banking sector reform policies, including updated
banking, accounting, and bankruptcy laws, overhauling the entire Hungarian financial
system. In December 1991, the Hungarian government introduced the Banking Act, which
required banks to reach a capital adequacy ratio of 8% by 1994 and accumulate loan-loss
reserves (Ábel and Szakadát 1997; Dreyer 2021). This act also introduced three categories
for rating loan portfolios (Ábel and Bonin 1993) and established the State Banking
Supervisory Agency (Borish et al. 1996). The establishment of the Banking Act was
followed by the enactment of a new bankruptcy law, which became effective on January 1,
1992, requiring any company with any outstanding debt that was more than 90 days in
arrears to initiate bankruptcy proceedings (Ábel and Bonin 1993).
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